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1. Introduction
The recent experience of the previously Centrally Planned Economies
(CPE) in Eastern Europe seems to suggest that a large fall of domestic
production and rising unemployment are unavoidable features of the
structural adjustment in the transformation process towards a market
economy. Frequently, the combination of a rapid disinflation program and
external trade liberalization is made responsible for such an outcome and,
therefore, a more gradual approach is recommended. This view is
challenged by the recent experience of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
which introduced external and internal liberalization measures and at the
same time realized a shock-type stabilization program. Nevertheless,
Vietnam did not pass through an adjustment recession with income
losses. The question arises whether this was due to favourable starting
conditions or due to a consistent Vietnamese economic policy. In this
context, differences in the economic regulation of public and private
enterprises are of Special interest.
This paper attempts to explore how a significant Output fall has been
avoided in Vietnam, and whether a structural adjustment took place or is
still to come. The expected impact of the Vietnamese reform program and
of external shocks is reviewed in the next section. In the third section the
economic Performance since 1986 in terms of GDP growth and changes
of employment and external trade is analysed. Moreover, structural
changes of GDP and employment are referred to changes of relative
prices. The underlying hypothesis of this section is that an adjustment
recession has been avoided due to a rapid adjustment of the structure of
production. In the fourth section, the manufacturing industry is analysed
by branches and by different forms of ownership. It will be shown how
structural changes were influenced by various industrial policy measures;
moreover, an explanation for the relative success of State owned
industrial enterprises is provided.
This paper is part of a research project on macroeconomic aspects of the
transformation process in Vietnam; financial support of the Volkswagen-Stiftung is
gratefully acknowledged.2. Ecpnomic reforms and externai shocks since 1986
One reason for the relative success of the transformation process in Viet-
nam could be that the Vietnamese economy simply has not experienced
such large negative shocks as the Eastern European countries. If this was
true, no puzzle would remain to be solved. If this explanation can be re-
futed, however, a quick response to the changed externai and internal
conditions must have taken place. Therefore, the impact of the main
reform measures, of the restrictive monetary policy and of externai shocks
is described in the following.
In.1976, after the second Vietnam war, the former South Vietnam was
merged with the northem part into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and
underwent a forced collectivization. A first attempt to reintroduce market
mechanisms into the Centrally Planned Economy led to a partial liberali-
zation of the agricultural sector since 1979. Only since 1986 - under the
Doi Moi ("renovation") slogan of the VI. Congress of the Communist Party
- Vietnam carried out a comprehensive economic reform program
(Ronnäs and Sjöberg, 1990; Diehl, 1993a). The central planning System
has already been replaced to some extent by market economy institu-
tions, prices were liberalised almost completely and the externai trade
regime was opened gradually. One of the most significant achievements
of the reform period was the successful stabilization of the price level
since 1989 without a significant Output decline.
2.1. Liberalization of domestic markets
State owned enterprises (SOE) accounted for only one third of GDP and
about 50 per cent of total industrial Output in 1989
1 (Table 1, AI), which is
relatively little compared to former CPEs in Eastern Europe. This was due
to tacit permission of the private sector in Vietnam, even in the heyday of
central planning, and due to the large agricultural sector which is mainly
organised in collective ownership. At the Start of Doi Moi policy, coopera-
1 A decomposition of GDP is not available for other periods; according to the
socialist "national income" statistics these shares can be assumed to be relativefy
stable throughout the 1980s.Table 1 - Value added










































a In current prices. - b In per cent of total GDP. - ° Public administration, health, education,
defence.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992a); own calculations.
tives were not regulated as comprehensive as the SOE although they
enjoyed similar benefits relative to the private sector; hence, the coopera-
tives should not be considered as part of the State sector.
Direct govemment controls over most of the SOE have been removed in
1987. Decisions on inputs, investment and production now fall in the
scope of the SOE management Since 1988, directors of SOE have
greater autonomy over their work-force, but the transfer of labour from
SOE into the non-state industrial sector has not been actively promoted
by the govemment. Nevertheless, employees of public enterprises have
been laid off and many local State enterprises have de facto been closed
down or sold out to former employees. The privatization of large public
enterprises, however, remains one of the large problems which are still to
be tackled.
The codification of business laws (property laws, contract laws, tax laws
etc.) since 1988 was meant to provide equal opportunities for the hitherto
discriminated private enterprise sector. Although the legal framework is
now almost complete - the bankruptcy law has passed the national
assembly in late 1993 - it is not clear whether the discrimination of the
private sector has already ended.
The füll liberalization of almost all domestic prices followed in 1989. Only
a few "sensitive" prices (e.g. energy, transport tariffs) remained
administered. The abolishment of all producer subsidies was announcedby the govemment in 1988. But since the budget deficit remained high in
the years 1989-90 (Table 4), this measure obviously has been postponed
until 1991; that is, subsidisation of loss making SOE probably continued in
an indirect way.
2.2. Liberalization of external trade
In 1988 the new law on foreign investment became effective which
admitted the establishment of Joint ventures with foreign majority and
offered tax holidays. Since the same year the external trade regime has
been gradually liberalised. The State monopoly in external trade has been
opened, but strict licensing procedures for private trading companies
prevent free competition with foreign suppliers (Chu Van Hop, 1992). The
State administration of export and import prices was replaced by a System
of ad-valorem tariffs, supplemented by a small number of import quotas.
The selective import tariffs were meant to protect the Vietnamese light
industry. Nevertheless, import competition has been stimulated by large
smuggling activities, especially for consumer goods.
Table 2 - Changes











































a Difference of end of period index values. - & +: depreciation; -: appreciation. -
 c
Nominal exchange rate change plus US inflation rate minus Vietnamese inflation rate. -
d Partiaily estimated.
Source: General Statistical Office (1993); Diehl (1993a); own calculations.
Since late 1988 the multiple official exchange rates have been sharply
devaluated dose to the black market exchange rate, and the thereafter
unified rate was rather flexible since March 1989, although under
supervision of the Central Bank. This measure made Vietnamese exports
more competitive, at least those of standardized products (raw materials,foodstuff), and at the same time enhanced the confidence r into the
Vietnamese currency. Whereas the devaluation of the Vietnamese Dong
was broadly in line with the domestic inflation rate in 1990 and 1991, the
nominal appreciation of the Dong in 1992 lead to a substantial
appreciation of the real exchange rate (Table 2) which has only partly
been compensated in 1993. The reason for that unexpected development
probably is the combination of increased inflows of foreign transfers and
stricter limitations of import demand. Moreover, the tight credit policy
apparently has led enterprises to sell their foreign exchange holdings to
the Central Bank against domestic currency (Dollar, 1994).
2.3. Shock-type stabilization program
Since 1985, inflation was running at several hundred per cent a year. In
1989, the Central Bank increased the credit interest rates above the
actual inflation rate and introduced interest bearing foreign exchange
denominated deposits. A first look at the structure of domestic credit leads
to the presumption, that both SOE and non-state enterprises suffered
from a restrictive credit policy since 1988, since their ratio of bank credit
to national income declined (Table 3). The marked decline of bank credits
to SOE, however, was caused by the increased financial autonomy of
SOE since 1988, by which their obligatory contributions to the public
budget and hence their demand for external finance were reduced
(UNIDO, 1991). Moreover, the sudden expansion of domestic bank



















































































Source: IMF, cited in Lipworth/Spitaller (1992).
savings relative to national income in 1989, which was a result of the
interest rate reform, was used for higher credits to the public budget from
which it was probably disbursed to SOE.
From 1988 onwards a number of measures were aimed at a more market-
oriented budget, e.g. the introduction of a turnover tax, a personal income
tax and a profit tax. The abolishment of all subsidies, which has been
announced for 1989 (Brabant, 1990), apparently has not led to a
significant fall of public expenditures. The budget deficit remained high
until 1991 when expenditures were cut, and increased revenues were
realized, especially from domestic crude oil production (Table 4).
Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the reforms on the inflation rate
was dramatically successful. Since the borrowing to the state enterprise
sector actually did not decline, the credibility of the internal and external
liberalization measures caused the inflation expectations - and hence the
inflation - to decline (Diehl, 1993b).
2.4. Dissolution of CMEA
In 1990, the trade protocols with CMEA states have been cancelled,
which reduced the demand for exports of Vietnamese light industrial
goods. The immediate consequence of the reduced import demand from
CMEA was the reduction of manufactures exports, that is, the Vietnamese
light industry experienced a negative demand shock. At the same time,
credits from the Soviet Union to finance the current account deficit, which
has been in the order of 10 per cent of GDP through the 1980s, were no
longer provided (Table 5). Without changes in the production structurethis would have led to an equally large reduction of imports with severe
consequences for investment in the manufacturing sector.
Table 5 - Current account, investment and savings, 1987-1992 (per cent of GDP)
Current account deficit (CAD)
= Gross investment (I)
- Gross domestic savings (S)
- Net transfers from abroad
0






































Due to the rapid development of export markets in Asia, especially for
marine products and crude oil, Vietnam managed to finance the same
volume of imports without raising new credits from other sources. In
addition, foreign direct investment, mainly from Hongkong and other
Asian countries, and transfers from oversea Vietnamese began to flow to
Vietnam in 1990, whereas multilateral credit agencies will resume lending
to Vietnam in 1994. Hence, even with little foreign assistance the negative
expenditure shock of 1990 has been managed well.
3. General performance of the Vietnamese economy
The previous section has shown that the Vietnamese economy has
experienced significant internal and external shocks. Due to the
liberalization of domestic markets relative prices can now be expected to
reflect true scarcities which would give an impact for the reallocation of
resources into an efficient production structure. The discrimination of the
private sector was diminished to some extent but subsidisation of SOEs
has probably continued until recently. Moreover, competition has been
increased by the liberalization of foreign trade although the industrial
sector still enjoys protection from selective tariffs and other import
restrictions. On the other hand, the shock-type stabilization and the
sudden cessation of CMEA trade credits put hard pressure on the
Vietnamese economy. In the following it will be analysed whether and
how the different sectors adjusted to these shocks.3.1. Macroeconomic developments
The economic reform program culminated in 1989 when domestic prices
and the official exchange rate were liberalised together with the
successful stabilization program. Nevertheless, Vietnam did not
experience a severe adjustment recession like the East European CPEs.
On the contrary, average per capita incomes continued to grow by 3-4 per
cent p.a. during the whole period due to the high growth rates of the
service sector (Table 6). Only the manufacturing sector recorded a
moderate decline of value added (-8 and -2 per cent in 1989/90) while
agriculture realized a moderate growth on average. It would be interesting
to know whether this relative success was based on rapid growth of the
private economy, but a differentiation of sectoral growth rates between
state and non-state (i.e. collective and private) sector is not available. The
respective statistics are only published for the industrial sector, which will
be analysed in more detail in the fourth section.
































































a SNA concept; in constant prices of 1989. - & Manufacturing, mining and construction. - °
Partially estimated.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992a; 1993); own calculations.
With respect to sectoral changes of the labour force only little information
is available. Employment statistics are only published for the industrial
sector, where employment was reduced by more than 700,000 or roughly
25 per cent between 1988 and 1991 (Table 7). The largest part of the
reduction (570,000) occurred in the non-state industrial sector, while the
state industrial sector realized a moderate reduction of about 140,000 (or17 per cent). The only published information on economywide labour is
the statistics on "social labour force", which probably includes temporary
employed and unemployed according to their latest employment. This
explains why the mass lay-offs of industrial labour in 1989 and 1990 are
not reflected in the social labour force statistics. Hence, the social labour
force statistics understate the structural change actually occurring.
2


































































































Source: General Statistical Office (1992c; .1993).
Since employment statistics are not available for agriculture and services,
it is not clear whether industrial labour has been absorbed by other
sectors. Another question to be left unanswered is whether the private
sector was able to absorb excess labour from the state sector. The labour
force statistics reports that the state sector labour force has been reduced
by 1.1 million (or 27 per cent) while the private sector labour force grew by
almost 5 million (or 21 per cent). But since employment, at least in the
industrial sector, is overstated by the labour force statistics it seems
2 Since there is no information on the methodology of the Vietnamese statistics, it
can only be speculated about the difference between "social labour force" and
"employment". Another possible explanation is the underestimation of private
sector employment in the industrial labour statistics, but this probably cannot
explain a large part of the discrepancy.reasonable to assume, that the rate of unemployment has grown since
1989.3
3.2. Explaining the pattern of structural change
In general, an adjustment recession is the deeper the larger the external
and internal shocks and the less mobile the factors of production, which
causes a delay of the necessary adjustments to changed conditions. The
previous section has shown that the Vietnamese economy did not suffer
from an adjustment recession (except for a moderate decline of
manufactures output) although it has experienced significant shocks.
Hence, one would expect that resources have moved towards, sectors
whose income chances had improved, and away from other sectors.
Since official information on wages and employment is virtually not
existent, sectoral changes will be analysed indirectly in the following way:
First, shifts in the nominal GDP shares are taken as indicator for the
reallocation of resources. Accordingly, a relative increase of nominal
value added in one sector represents an increase of distributable income
which translates into a higher employment share if the wage structure
remains fairly constant. Second, shifts in the real GDP shares indicate the
change in the structure of production. Together with the first step this
leads to a hypothesis about the relative growth of labour productivity.
Third, these productivity growth differentials are referred to changes of
relative prices.
4 At this point, the plausibility of the method can be tested.
According to a simple model of structural change (Baumol, 1967), relative
price changes are inversely related to productivity growth differentials,
that is, the relative price of the sector with the highest productivity growth
decreases. It has to be kept in mind, however, that in the transformation
period these productivity trends are superimposed by efficiency gains due
to liberalisation measures.
The sectoral structure of the Vietnamese economy followed a clear trend
since the beginning of economic transformation (Table 8):
3 Unemployment is not reported in the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam. A recent
estimate puts the number of unemployed and underemployed at six million, or 17
per cent of the "social labour force" (Vietnam Investment Review, 20-26
December 1993).
4 Since the quantity change is taken to be the real change of sectoral value added,
imputed value added prices (and not output prices) are to be analyzed.11
Table 8 - Sectoral composition of GDP, 1986-1992 (in per cent)










































a SNA concept; in current prices. - & SNA concept; in constant prices of 1989. -
 c Public
administration, health, education, defence.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992a; 1993).
The nominal GDP share of agriculture showed large fluctuations around a
value of about 35 per cent, whereas the share of the service sector
increased steadily from 34 per cent to 38 per cent. This leads to the
presumption that the employment share of agriculture remained constant
while the service sector gained employment by absorbing the dismissed
industrial workers. A disaggregation of the service sector shows that
employment in public services {public administration, health and
education services, and the armed forces) has not been changed
significantly.
5 Hence, almost all of the expansion of the service sector is
due to the growth of the private sector (Table 7).
The real GDP share of agriculture declined by 5 percentage points and
the share of services increased by 5.5 percentage points. The growth of
the services sector is simply the reaction to the increased demand after
the deregulation measures. Since the entrepreneurial spirit from the pre-
socialist era was still existing, the supply reaction was relatively rapid. By
contrast, the manufacturing industry shrinked by about 3.5 percentage
points between 1986 and 1992. This points to a typical transformation
shock which is assumed to hit the manufacturing industry hardest; at
least, this is the common experience of other CPEs. In all East European
countries, value added in manufacturing decreased by more than 25 per
cent in the first two years of the transformation period. The rise of the
5 The Vietnamese army dismissed about 500,000 soldiers after the demobilization
of armed forces from Cambodia in 1989. Hence, the employment in other public
services probably increased in the 1990s.12
industrial share in the 1990s is only due to crude oil production, which
recorded steep growth rates since it came onstream in 1989.
A comparison of nominal shifts and real shifts leads to the hypothesis that
labour productivity growth was lowest in agriculture and highest in the
industrial sector, whereas productivity growth in the service sector was
about the national average. A final judgement with respect to the
manufacturing industries, however, is not possible since the respective
nominal value added shares have are not been published yet.
Value added prices (pVA) have been calculated from data on sectoral
value added at constant (VA
1") and current prices (vA
nom) as pva=^^-; this
can be transformed to a weighted difference of gross output price (pG0)
and average material inputs price (pMi): pVA=-L_.pG0——-pM, where a l-a 1-a
denotes the material inputs coefficient I—1. Accordingly, the relative
^GO'J
value added price rises c.p. if input prices decrease more or output prices
increase faster.
The representation from the income side shows that these imputed price
indices can also be interpreted as average gross factor rewards in the
respective sector: pva=—^—+—^—+
Tind~
$UBs, where w and r denote money
r MFPL MFPK VA
r '
wage and interest rate, and MFPX is the marginal factor productivity of
labour (X=L) and capital (X-K) respectively. The third term represents the
influence of indirect taxes and subsidies which is due to the fact that the
published value added data are at market prices. According to this
formula, the relative value added price rises c.p. if factor rewards are
increased above average or if the productivity growth is below average.
According to the productivity trends estimated above, both the agricultural
and the service prices are expected to increase relative to the industrial
prices, and the agricultural prices the most. The analysis of value added
prices reveals the following trend (Table 9):
The value added prices in agriculture experienced large fluctuations
relatively to the industrial sector. In some years climatic influences were
responsible for large unexpected changes of aggregate supply. Since
external trade was not allowed to mitigate these fluctuations this led to
large movements of gross output prices and pushed peasant incomes
above average in the year 1987 (many taifuns) and below average in13 Bibliothek
1989 and 1992.(record harvests). Over the whole period, agricultural
prices showed a rising trend which is consistent with the imputed low or
possibly even negative productivity growth. Moreover, the large increases
in 1986-88 can only be explained by the permission of private land use in
the large which allowed a catching-up of agricultural factor incomes. In
general, the cut in input subsidies for fertilizer and gasoline worked in the
opposite direction. But since this effect hit the industrial sector even
harder it can be assumed that this would rather cause relative agricultural
prices to increase.
Table 9 - Change of relative prices,
a 1986-1992 (in per ccent)















a Imputed price index of sectoral value added, relative to the industrial sector.
Source Table A3.
The relative value added price of services showed a significant upward
trend relative to the industrial sector which is consistent with the
estimated productivity growth differential. In 1991 and 1992, however, the
relative price of services decreased. This can be explained by a high
productivity increase in the service sector, caused by the deregulation of
the private service sector (especially tourism, restaurants and retail trade),
whereas the cut in subsidies obviously had only a minor direct effect on
services sector incomes, except for some branches (e.g. transportation).
Alternatively, industrial wages may have been increased
overproportionately, leading to higher industrial prices.
Until 1990, the value added prices in the industrial sector decreased both
relative to agricultural and to service prices, which is consistent with the
relatively fast productivity growth. Moreover, relatively large input price
shocks from the cut in subsidies for energy and other materiaj inputs,
which could not be fully translated into higher industrial output prices,
have reinforced this effect. The only puzzle with respect to the industrial
sector is the relative price increase in 1991/92 that hints to excessive
wage increases or low productivity growth. This development could be an
indication for re-softened budget constraints for industrial SOE, but this14
question obviously needs further analysis of the industrial sector on a
disaggregated level. Another reason for disaggregated analysis is the
presumption that capital intensive industries suffered from increased
import competition whereas labour intensive industries gained from export
liberalization.
Summing up, the Vietnamese economy has experienced significant
structural change which can be explained by large productivity
differentials. However, the high productivity growth of the industrial sector
needs further examination. A priori there are two possible explanations:
fierce competition from domestic and foreign suppliers may have lead to a
quick adjustment of the Vietnamese industry; alternatively, the payment of
subsidies may have continued due to the lobbying of SOE at the expense
of the private non-industrial sectors. At the first glance, the second
explanation fits the relatively few layoffs in the state industrial sector
(Table 5) better, but an analysis by industries lends some support for the
first explanation.
4. The manufacturing sector in detail
Gross industrial output recorded an average annual growth of more than
10 per cent in the years 1982-88, reflecting the industrialisation priority of
the government and the large economic assistance from the USSR (Vo
Nhan Tri, 1990). About 50 per cent of the manufacturing sector output has
been produced by non-state enterprises (handicraft cooperatives and
private enterprises) which are mostly small-scale firms with less than 50
workers employed. Although the government issued five year plans and
short-term directives, economic activities beyond the official plan have
been admitted to a certain extent since the early eighties (Diehl, 1993a).
Hence, the starting point is rather different from most of the former
centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe.
Following the 1988/89 shock program the output of the manufacturing
industry fell by 8 and 2 per cent in 1989 and 1990 which was a relatively
moderate adjustment recession, and recovered in 1991/92. In contrast to
Eastern Europe, however, the number of industrial workers has been
reduced early in the recession by 11 and 6 per cent in 1989 and 1990
(Table A5). Since the fall in employment was not accompanied by equally
large output falls, the lay-offs obviously revealed only the hidden
unemployment of "indirect" workers (i.e. those not directly involved in the15
production process; cf. UNIDO, 1991). A detailed analysis of the
adjustment recession reveals large differences across industries, types of
ownership and regions. In the following, it will be attempted to explain this
pattern as the result of liberalised market forces and policy incentives.
4.1. Development by industries
As a consequence of the liberalisation of domestic markets and of the
external trade regime pursued since 1987 one would expect significant
changes of relative product prices and a gradual adjustment of the
production structure. According to the pattern of comparative advantage,
some industries can be expected to win and others to lose. Before the
liberalisation program was initiated, the government pursued the goal of
national self-sufficiency in all sectors and, therefore, artificially repressed
the user cost of capital. Since Vietnam is a labour abundant economy one
would now expect labour intensive industries to gain relatively to capital
intensive industries. However, this requires domestic enterprises to
compete with domestic and foreign suppliers, and mobile factors of
production to move into new allocations.
Food processing, textiles and clothing, engineering (machines, electrical
equipment and other metal products) and construction materials are the
largest industries of Vietnam's manufacturing industry,
6 accounting for 44,
12, 10 and 9 per cent of gross manufacturing output in 1991 (Table
A6).The analysis of sectoral output growth rates 1989-92 shows
significant differences across manufacturing industries (Table A6). Some
branches suffered from a deep output decline in 1989/90 from which they
did not yet recover (machinery, metal products, wood products). Other
branches recovered in 1991/92 in spite of a deep decline in the earlier
years (glass and ceramics, pulp and paper, textiles, leather products).
The larger part of manufacturing industries, however, showed relatively
high growth rates after passing a moderate output decline (foodstuff,
clothing, metallurgy, electrical equipment, chemical products and
construction materials).
The structural change in the manufacturing sector only to some extent fits
into the expected pattern of relatively declining capital-intensive sectors.
6 Except when stated otherwise, electricity generation and crude oil production,
which are to 94 per cent state owned, are excluded from the following analysis.16
What is puzzling at a first sight is the rapid increase of metallurgy,
chemicals and construction materials (which can be assumed to be
capital intensive), and the decline of machinery, wood products, textiles
and leather products (which can be assumed to be labour intensive).
Hence, additional explanation is needed for these sectors. If sectoral price
data were available, the performance of an industry could have been
analysed in terms of supply or demand shocks as it has been done for the
case of East European countries (e.g. Borensztein and Ostry, 1992).
Since time series of sectoral prices are not yet available for Vietnam
7, the
analysis is limited to anecdotal evidence on the degree of foreign
competition, the impact of domestic price liberalisation and the sectoral
distribution of FDI.
Table 10 - Exports by commodities, 1987-91 (in per cent)
Exports to CMEA (mill, rouble)
Exports to other countries (mill. US$)













































First, both from the external trade liberalisation and the expenditure shock
of the CMEA dissolution one would expect a structural change of external
trade and production in Vietnam. According to the comparative
advantages now revealed, a sector producing tradeable goods would gain
if the price of the good has increased relative to other domestically
At present, th.8 analysis of relative price changes within the Vietnamese
manufacturing sector can only be based on the cumulated price changes in the
period 1982-1989 (Table A10). In this period the government attempted several
times (1982, 1985) to "correct" the structure of relative prices by administrative
decisions, but the final liberalisation of almost all output prices 1989 is probably
the most significant change of relative prices.17
produced tradeable goods. At present, however, information on external
trade by commodities is limited to only three categories: agriculture,
mining and heavy industy, and light industry (Table 10); information on
prices of single tradeable goods is not available. Since 1988, when the
first measures to liberalise external trade have been introduced, the
volume and structure of Vietnamese exports underwent significant
changes.
8 Exports to CMEA countries doubled and exports to other
countries tripled from 1988 to 1990. The rapid increase was almost
equally caused by the exploitation of crude oil and the productivity
increase in agriculture, whereas the export of manufactures decreased
even in absolute numbers.
Since the larger part of consumer goods (e.g. clothing) exports went to
CMEA countries, the share decreased significantly after the demise of
CMEA in 1990. Moreover, some products with relatively low quality
standards, which were a result of the previous protection from foreign
competition and the barter trade with CMEA states, had to face strong
competition from foreign suppliers. This applies especially to machinery,
wood products, glass and ceramics, leather products and textiles. At the
same time, foreign competition increased significantly for light industries
since the import of consumer goods is relatively easy. With the exception
of wood products, these industries (textiles, leather, glass and ceramics)
apparently went through a process of restructuring with a relatively large
output decline. Since then, however, Vietnam probably succeeded in
increasing the quality of its consumer goods so that a trend reversal has
already taken place. By contrast, those industries which only survived
with subsidised imports in the past (machinery and other metal products)
could only recover with continued high import protection (Table 11).
Second, some sectors profited from the elimination of the previous
rationing system at low administratively fixed prices and hence increased
production as its relative prices went up (metallurgy, construction
materials). It is open to debate whether this was possible only with import
protection or whether domestic suppliers in these capital and energy
intensive sectors were really competitive. The latter cannot be ruled out a
8 The structure of Vietnam's imports did not change significantly since 1988 (Table
A4).18
priori since electricity is still relatively cheap in Vietnam, notwithstanding a
significant price increase.
































Hot-rolled steel bars: 10
Car engines: 50; other parts: 80; cars: 100
Consumer electronics: 30-40
Bicycles: 60
Plastic products: 20-30; tyres: 40-50




Fish: 20; vegetable products: 40
Beverages: 70-100; cigarettes: 120
Yarn: 20; fabrics: 30; clothing: 40
Shoe parts: 20; leather products: 30-50
Source: Vietnam Ministry for Trade and Tourism (1992).
Third, some sectors (electrical equipment, chemical products and
clothing) already profited from capital import {SSCI, 1993). Although
actual inflows of FDI are still low in absolute numbers, they financed a
large part of domestic investment (Table 12). The attractiveness of these
branches for FDI, however, is not only due to the cheap Vietnamese
labour but also due to significant import protection (Table 11).
Table 12- FDI approvals and actual inflows 1988-93
FDI approvals (mill. US$)
(No. of approvals)
Av. investment (mill. US$)





































Source: Vietnam Investment Review, 4.1.1993, 10.1.1994.19
In summary, the manufacturing sector experienced a relatively rapid
structural change within four years following the liberalisation of domestic
markets and the gradual opening of the external trade regime. Most of the
changes were in accordance with what one would have expected for a
labour abundant country like Vietnam. Foodstuff, clothing, footwear and
assembling of electrical products expanded, whereas machinery and
other metal products declined significantly. All manufacturing branches
enjoy significant import protection which is designed to promote higher
processing levels by tariff escalation. Moreover, the expansion of some
industries has been directly influenced by state priority investment in joint
ventures with foreign firms (metallurgy) which can be justified with
abundant natural resources, or by preferential interest rates (chemical
products).
Hence, there is no clear-cut answer to the question whether competitive
forces have begun to work within the Vietnamese manufacturing industry,
or whether the influence of government policies have hindered structural
change by protecting the existing enterprises.
4.2. Development by ownership
The reforms of the last five years have continued to set up the conditions
for a competitive market economy. Legal reforms since 1988 gave SOE a
larger financial autonomy and placed private enterprises on an equal
footing with SOE. Moreover, the 1990 banking sector reform, which
tightened the supervision of state banks' lending activities and admitted
private credit agencies, was aimed at efficiency oriented capital allocation.
Hence, one would have expected strong competition between SOE and
private enterprises and a declining output share of SOE.
In 1988 SOE accounted for about 50 per cent of gross industrial
production
9 and 27 per cent of total industrial labour (Table A11). On
average, the output fall 1989-90 in the manufacturing sector was of about
the same size for SOE (-6.5 per cent) and non-state enterprises (-5.0 per
cent), and in 1991/92 SOE recovered much faster (+23.4 per cent) than
non-state enterprises (+13.3 per cent). The layoffs in the non-state sector
were significantly larger than in the state sector (28 per cent of the 1988
9 Data 1988 are only available in 1982 prices; in 1989 prices the share was about
60 per cent.20
level against 13 per cent; Table A5). Moreover, the performance of SOE
was in general better the higher their market share in that industry. For
example, the output of metallurgy and chemical products increased by
more than 60 per cent form 1988 to 1992. This seems to be in contrast to
the expected result of stronger competition from the private sector. A
detailed analysis, however, provides an explanation.
First, a disaggregation of sectors by ownership reveals that the output
growth of SOE in 1988-92 was below that of the non-state sector in
almost all sectors, except for the production of chemical products,
construction materials and textiles (Table A6). Hence, SOE lost market
shares in all but these three industries which accounted for about one
fourth of manufacturing output in 1991.
Second, structural change took place within the state sector and the non-
state sector. Locally managed SOE have been hit hardest by the
adjustment recession, whereas centrally managed SOE still recorded
positive output growth in 1989-90. This leads to the presumption that the
discrimination of the private sector has not ended, whereas the weak
fiscal situation of the local authorities did not allow the continued payment
of subsidies to locally managed SOE. By contrast, the weak performance
of the non-state sector was mainly the result of the collapse of the
cooperatives. More than 80 per cent of the industrial cooperatives,
employing about 46 per cent of non-state workers in 1988, has been
dissolved until 1992 (Table A11). The formation of new private
enterprises, which accounted for 34 per cent of manufacturing output in
1992 after 23 per cent in 1988, could not compensate for all the jobs lost.
Although the (formal) privatisation of SOE has been delayed, a number of
SOE obviously has been dissolved or merged into larger units. Due to
dissipation, mergers or "spontaneous" privatisation, the number of
centrally and locally managed SOE decreased by more than 700 (or 25
per cent) from 1988 to 1992, mostly locally managed SOE.
Third, not the SOE share as such, but historically determined productivity
advantages matter. The share of SOE in 1991 gross manufacturing output
was about 60 per cent on average but varied widely from 95 per cent in
metallurgy over 61 per cent in foodstuff to 22 per cent in other metal
products. Only in industries where small scale firms dominated (wood
products, metal products, glass and ceramics and leather products), non-
state enterprises produced more than SOE (Table A6). The pattern of21
sectoral growth rates, however, can be explained by the productivity gaps
between SOE and non-state enterprises which is largely determined by
the historical investment pattern. A comparison of output growth rates and
productivity gaps (Table A7) reveals that the non-state sector in general
performed better than the SOE in sectors with small productivity gaps.
The only exceptions are the food industry and pulp and paper production.
The average gross output per worker^ was significantly higher in SOE
than in cooperatives or private enterprises in 1991. Only in two industries
(machinery and leather products) non-state enterprises had the highest
labour productivity of all firms (Table A7). This reflects the large
productivity lead of centrally managed SOE in the capital-intensive
industries (e.g. chemicals, cement, woodpulp and textiles), which is due
to the state investment priorities in the early eighties. In addition, the
average firm size varies significantly among the different types of
ownership, from 600 workers in centrally managed SOE and 160 workers
in locally managed SOE over 40 workers in cooperatives and private
enterprises to 3 in the household firms (Table A11). Hence, potential
economies of scale may help to explain the productivity gaps.
Gross output productivity changes in the period 1989-1991 are probably
only reflecting the increased capacity utilisation and the massive lay-offs
in 1989 and 1990, since the highest increases are recorded in those
industries with the largest reduction of workers, e.g. chemicals, metal
products, construction material or glass and ceramics. The limited
information on the average wage in various industries
1
1 supports the view
that the payment of wages has become productivity oriented for all types
of ownership. In some cases, e.g. in the case of the private electrical
machinery or textiles and clothing enterprises, it can be assumed that
recent investments in new equipment, especially from FDI (SSCI, 1993),
has contributed to the productivity increase.
1
0 Disaggregated value added data for manufacturing are only available for 1989
(Table A7), but not differentiated by ownership.
1
1 From a recent survey covering about 1000 enterprises it has been concluded that
there is a strong correlation between average value added per worker and
average wage rates for all types of ownership, and that the lowest wage levels
and the most unequal distribution of incomes are found in the cooperatives
(Ronnas, 1992).22
Fourth, since SOE can hardly be expected to operate on commercial
criteria in an environment of an incomplete commercial law system,
government decrees on reorganisation and dissolution of SOE were
issued in late 1991. The aim of these decrees was the "evaluation" (i.e. a
complete audit) of all SOE and the formal liquidation of those regarded as
unprofitable (Business Vietnam, Vol. 4, 1992, No. 7). Until November
1993 only four SOE have begun selling shares, a large part of which was
given to the employees (Vietnam Investment Review, 29.11.1993). By
contrast, it has been reported that many SOE have already been
privatised "spontaneously", i.e. initiated by the workers without approval
of the local authorities (Truong and Gates, 1992). This adds to the
impression that the credible threat of formal liquidation is a strong
incentive for managers of SOE to adjust.
Notwithstanding the interpretation given so far, there is some information
on the discrimination of the non-state sector which has not ended
completely. For instance, subsidies to the centrally managed state
industrial sector aparently continued to be substantial into the 1990s. This
was particularly true with regard to access to bank credits and the supply
of certain subsidised inputs (McCarty, 1993) which has been phased out
in 1993. A first look at the structure of domestic credit leads to the
presumption that both SOE and non-state enterprises suffered from a
restrictive credit policy since 1988, since their ratio of bank credit to
national income declined (Table A2). However, the marked decline of
bank credits for SOE was caused by the increased financial autonomy of
SOE since 1988, by which their obligatory contributions to the public
budget and hence their demand for external finance were reduced
(UNIDO, 1991).
Moreover, the sudden expansion of domestic credit - relative to national
income - in 1989, which was made possible by the improved saving
accounts as a result of the stabilization program, apparently was not used
to improve the access of the non-state sector to bank credits. On the
contrary, the additional credit was given to the public budget from which it
was probably redisbursed to SOE, i.e. the discrimination of the non-state
sector obviously increased even further since 1988. In addition, many of
the cooperative banks in rural areas are in a liquidity crisis since they do
not have full access to the Central Bank refinancing facilities (Radke,
1992). From a recent survey it was concluded that the majority of
transactions of non-state enterprises are made on a 'cash on delivery'23
basis. The small reliance on external capital reflects an absolute lack of
access to external capital rather than a high price of capital. Private
enterprises often have to rely on earned profits or informal finance
agencies to finance their investment (Ronnas, 1992). This situation,
however, is not too different from non-socialist countries in Asia at a
comparable stage of economic development (Riedel, 1993).
Until December 1992, FDI projects were approved mostly in the form of
joint ventures with SOE. Only since 1993, joint ventures with private
enterprises are admitted (World Bank, 1993). In addition, SOE still have
advantages over private firms with respect to land use rights and external
trade licenses. On the other hand, the profit tax is collected only
incomplete from private firms. Hence, it is not clear to what extent these
effects net out or whether SOE still receive preferential treatment.
In summary, the development of different types of ownership has shown a
clear polarisation: locally managed SOE and cooperatives have shrinked
significantly, whereas the large centrally managed SOE and the emerging
private sector will share the market. The relative succes of centrally
managed SOE can probably be explained by high investment due to
preferential access to credits and foreign exchange and by joint ventures
with foreign investors. It can be expected, however, that the private sector
becomes a strong competitor, even if investment credits from the state
owned official banking system are not extended, if only the discrimination
in external trade and foreign investment relations is ended.
4.3. Development by regions
An empirical analysis of the Vietnamese manufacturing industry by
regions has to consider that the hitherto published statistics on regional
industrial output include electricity generation and mining. Whereas the
exploitation of natural resources in the North (coal, iron ore, phosphate)
has not been increased significantly in the last years, crude oil production
- which is located offshore in the South - recorded steep growth rates
since 1989. Therefore, the industrial output of Vung Tau province - which
is virtually identical with the total crude oil production in Vietnam - is
excluded in the following analysis to prevent misinterpretations of the
regional statistics.
More than half of Vietnam's industrial output is produced in the South.
With .4 million inhabitants Ho Chi Minn City alone accounted for about 3124
per cent of total industrial output in 1990, which is slightly more than in the
northern provinces with 25 million people, including the million cities
Hanoi and Haiphong (Table A12). By contrast, industrial employment in
the northern regions was almost four times that of Ho Chi Minh City in
1990. That is, average gross output per worker in Ho Chi Minh City is
more than three times that in Hanoi, and almost four times that in northern
provinces. Since the interregional productivity gap is even larger for the
non-state sector, where intersectoral productivity differences are relatively
low (Table A7), the sectoral composition of the regional industry output is
unlikely to explain a large part of the observed average interregional
productivity differential. Hence, it can be assumed that industry workers in
the South are on average more productive than their counterparts in the
North. At the beginning of the reform period this was at least partly due to
the legacy of the past: machinery and equipment in the North had been
provided by China and the Soviet Union, whereas the South (until 1973)
had received capital goods from the USA and West Europe. In
combination with a higher quality of the physical capital stock, workers in
the South may also profit from better formal education and learning on the
job, and from more appropriate management.
At first glance, different regional growth rates can be explained by the
industrial structure that prevailed in the pre-reform era and the adjustment
pattern of the respective industries. In the pre-reform period, the regional
structure of manufacturing industry in Vietnam has been shaped
according to political priorities rather than by locational factors (natural
resources, infrastructure etc.). In broad lines, heavy industry (incl. textiles)
is concentrated in the North and light industry (incl. chemical products) in
the South (World Bank, 1993). The state of infrastructure may help to
explain regional differences although the North-South pattern is less
clear. The road network is in a worse state in the North, and the North
South junction is already used to capacity. Electricity, however, is in
ample supply in the North whereas enterprises in the South have to face
regular power cuts.
In addition to these locational factors, government policies may have an
indirect regional impact during the transformation process. First, a large
centrally managed state sector is probably more successful than a
smaller one in gaining financial support from public budgets. Accordingly,
provinces with a high share of SOE are favoured by relatively large public
investment. In 1990, the weight of central SOE was still much larger in the25
North (63 per cent of industrial output and 27 per cent of industrial
employment) compared to the South (34 and 16 per cent). Second,
regional governments may have created different incentives, e.g. to
promote the private sector and to attract foreign investment.
The adjustment recession 1989/90 has been deeper in the North,
especially in the main cities (-13 per cent in Hanoi and -27 per cent in
Haiphong, compared to -4 per cent in Ho Chi Minn City). Moreover, the
non-state sector
1
2 in the South performed significantly better than in the
North (+53 per cent in 1988-92 against +21 per cent). To some extent this
pattern can be attributed to the different sectoral structure structure: the
high output fall in the North is probably due to the prevalence of
engineering and other metal manufactures, whereas the South has
profited from the stable growth of food processing, based on the
prospering agricultural sector in the Mekong delta, and from the growth of
the clothing industry. However, the performance of some other branches
is at odds with this simple North-South pattern. For example, the cement
production and the chemical industry, which are also concentrated in the
North, recorded extraordinary growth rates on the national level, whereas
some light industrial branches (leather products, glass and ceramics)
passed through a significant recession.
This leads to the conclusion, that not only the sectoral composition of the
regional industry mattered for the regional economic performance but also
regionally different adjustment patterns within industries. One reason for
this difference could be that a higher percentage of GDP is saved in the
South due to higher average incomes. Since the national capital markets
in Vietnam are regionally fragmented due to the underdeveloped banking
system, this higher savings rate allows for a higher investment rate in the
South.
By contrast, the ownership structure does not explain these regional
differences since the ranking of regions not only holds for the industry
average but also for all types of ownership. Locally managed SOE have
been hit hardest in all regions, followed by non-state enterprises, whereas
centrally managed SOE recovered already in 1990. This supports the
1
2 Output data of centrally managed SOE for 1991 and 1992 are not yet available by
regions (cf. Note (d) to Table A12); however, the ranking of regions probably
remained stable in 1991/92.26
view, that governmental regulations with respect to the state sector have
not been too different in the regions: locally managed SOE were not
successful in gaining support due to the strained public budgets on the
provincial level, whereas the centrally managed SOE were still assisted
by the respective federal ministries at the expense of the non-state sector.
The major exception was Hanoi, where the output of non-state enterprises
decreased by one sixth in 1988-92 whereas the output of locally managed
SOE grew by 6 per cent. By contrast, in Ho Chi Minh City the non-state
sector did not go through any recession, and almost kept pace with the
centrally managed SOE. Since the performance of the non-state sector is
the result of dissolving cooperatives and an emerging private sector, it
can be concluded that the private sector was more dynamic in the South,
whereas cooperatives played a large role in the North and especially in
Hanoi. Governmental regulations of the private sector have probably been
stricter in the North whereas private entrepreneurship in the South has
been encouraged in the early eighties already.This could also explain the
large gap between state and non-state sectoral growth rates in the North.
Foreign investors apparently were attracted by the more liberal attitude of
local governments in the South, whereas the lower wages in the North
obviously were not relevant for investors. This finding points to differences
in the qualification of workers. Moreover, the first export processing zones
were established in the South, and the first manufacturing enterprises,
started operations in late 1993. 80 per cent of all FDI approvals in the
period 1988-91 went to the South, which was partly due to the large
investment in crude oil production (almost 25 per cent of all FDI
approved). In 1992-93, however, when this resource-related type was less
important, the share of the South was still as high as 66 per cent (Vietnam
Investment Review, 10.-16.1.1994). Compared to the regional output
shares FDI is now almost equally distributed which leads to the
conclusion that regulations in the North are now similar to those in the
South. The average FDI inflow per worker, however, is still significantly
larger in the South. This supports the view, that the productivity lead is
due to higher capital stock per worker.
In summary, the differences in regional growth patterns can clearly be
attributed to differences in the sectoral composition at the starting point,
and to different productivity levels, whereas the "ownership mix" in itself
cannot explain very much. It remains an open question, however, whether27
the productivity growth has been seriously hindered by stricter
government regulations in the North or whether the productivity differential
simply reflects the legacy of the past in the South, i.e. larger investment
and higher entrepreneurial capacities.
Summing up the whole chapter, it has been shown that market forces
have played a large role for the structural change within the
manufacturing sector. Obviously, relative prices were allowed to change
significantly, and factors were relatively mobile, so that some industries
have expanded while others declined. The sectoral change can be
explained by increased competition from foreign suppliers and delays due
to scarce investment funds, although the overall pattern did not show the
expected relative decline of capital intensive industries. With the
exception of those industries where SOE possessed large productivity
leads, the share of SOE in the manufacturing sector has declined since
1988. Many cooperatives and locally managed SOE were dissolved or
privatised, whereas the privatisation of large centrally managed SOE
makes only little progress. The remaining discrimination of private
enterprises apparently has been reduced since 1990, so that the private
sector can be expected to accelerate growth in the next years. Finally, the
regional growth differences could be traced back to the regional industry
mix and to the observed large productivity differential between North and
South for the same industries.
5. Conclusions
The empirical analysis has shown why the Vietnamese economy did not
experience significant income losses in the transition period in spite of the
relatively fast stabilisation-cum-liberalisation program. This result can be
attributed basically to the flexibility of the Vietnamese economy (i.e.
flexible relative prices and mobile factors of production), in contrast to the
less successful East European CPE. The growth of agricultural production
since the early eighties and above all the expansion of the service sector
since 1988 cushioned the consequences of the temporary decline of the
industry sector in 1989/90. Mass lay-offs in the industrial sector have
been compensated through the rapid growth of the service sector.
Significant structural change occurred within manufacturing, both by
industries and by ownership, but the resulting overall pattern did not show
the expected relative expansion of labour intensive sectors. This can be
attributed to remaining trade protection for some sectors and to a quality28
improvement necessary for those sectors which until recently were
structured according to the needs of the division of labour among CMEA
countries. With increasing inflows of FDI, however, the expected pattern
will probably emerge in the years to come.
Industrial cooperatives have been largely transformed into private
enterprises, and many small SOE have already been dissolved or
"spontaneously privatised". The industrial sector has increasingly been
polarised between large centrally managed SOE {which proved to be very
successful) and the emerging private sector which was the main reason
why aggregate industrial output recovered within two years after the
shock-type stabilisation-cum-liberalisation program. The success of the
state industrial sector can be attributed to better starting conditions due to
higher investment in the past, and to the channeling of FDI towards the
state sector. However, the discrimination of private enterprises on the
markets for credits and essential inputs seems to have lasted until
recently. In addition, private enterprises are especially hindered by
excessive regulations and by institutional deficits, e.g. with respect to land
use.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the main reason for the avoidance
of a severe adjustment recession in the industrial sector has not been the
sustained subsidisation of SOE but the consistency of the whole reform
program. Essential elements of the program have been: the rapid
disinflation, the floating of the exchange rate together with moderate
import protection and export promotion, and the credible threat of
dissolution for SOE. The credibility of the reform program (and especially
of the SOE reorganisation) is due to the introduction of a new government
structure and the popular anti-corruption campaign that did not spare
leading politicians. The future development will show, whether the
Vietnamese success story is sustainable. An essential precondition for
the successful restructuring of the industrial sector is the settlement of the
accumulated SOE debts, the further improvement of the banking system,
and the change of managerial incentives, especially in those SOE whose
productivity is not significantly higher than in non-state enterprises29
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Department of the World Bank, Washington.Table A1 — Gross domestic product by ownership 1986-1992 (bill. Dong at 1989 prices)
State sector (MPS)
(in per cent of national income)







= State sector (SNA)
(in per cent of GDP)
(excl. fuels; in per cent of GDP)
Non-state sector (MPS)












= Non-state sector (SNA)
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a The gap between MPS and SNA has been attributed either to the state or to the non-state sector according to branch characteristics. - °
Not included in national income (MPS); disaggregation in 1986-88 partially estimated. -
c In 1990-92 included in housing and tourism.




- Cooperatives and private sector
Currency and Dong deposits
Foreign exchange deposits
GDP (at current prices)




- Cooperatives and private sector
























































































































- Price index of gross output (MPS)
- Price index of material inputs (MPS)
- Price index of value added (MPS)
- Price index of value added (SNA)
Industry, mining, construction
- Price index of gross output (MPS)
- Price index of material inputs (MPS)
- Price index of value added (MPS)
- Price index of value added (SNA)
Services
- Price index of gross output (MPS)
- Price index of material inputs (MPS)
- Price index of value added (MPS)
- Price index of value added (SNA)
Total

















a Calculated from data in current prices and in 1989
the SNA.

















































































































Source: Le Van Toan(1992); General Statistical Office (1993); own calculations.Table A4 — External trade by commodities 1986-93
Exports to non-CMEA countries (mill. US$)
Exports to CMEA countries (mill, transfer rouble)
thereof: Agricultural products
8




In per cent of total exports:
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Imports to non-CMEA countries (mill. US$)
Imports to CMEA countries (mill, transfer rouble)






in per cent of total imports:
8
Imports from CMEA countries
8






a Transfer Rouble converted into US-$ at parity. -
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Source: General Statistical Office (1992b; 1992c; 1993); own calculations.Table A6 — Gross production














































































































































1982 (1988-90) and of 1989 (1990-92).
Cooperatives and private sector


















































































Source: General Statistical Office (1992b; 1992c; 1993); own calculations.Table A7— Labour productivity

















a Gross output (in prices of
leather.
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per worker
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 cTextiles, clothing and
Source: General Statistical Office (1992c, b).Table A8 — Value added and external trade by sectors





































































































































































































a Based on the 54 sectors input-output table prepared by a team from UN Statistical Office and General Statistical Office of Vietnam. -
 D
Net of subsidies. -
 c Incl. import duties (240.6 bill. Dong). -
(3 Incl. fuel imports (1254 bill. Dong).
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a Relative to manufactures.
Gross output 1990 (bill. Dong)









































 D All industries excl. electricity and fuels.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992c; 1993); own calculations.Table A11 — Gross production and employment in manufacturing 1988-1992 by type of ownership
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a Division between private enterprises and households partially estimated. -
 D Own estimations from statistics including electricity
and mining. .
Source: General Statistical Office(1992b; 1993); own estimations.
 !Table A12 — Gross industrial production















































































































































































































































































a Manufacturing plus electricity and fuels; gross output in constant prices of 1982 (1988-90) and of 1989 (1990-92). -
D Index (total
industry = 100). -
c Share of the region in total industry. -
d Output of centrally managed SOE (and hence total output) not yet allocated
onto regions. -
 e Excl. Vung Tau province (= offshore oil production).
Source: General Statistical Office(1992b; 1993); own calculations.